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Preface 
This discussion paper addresses several weaknesses of the performance measurement 
procedures that are normally found in dairy cooperatives in the Western world. We fur-
ther suggest an alternative approach that can ameliorate some of the inherent incentive 
problems and measurement problems that tend to plague many dairy cooperatives. We 
hope our thoughts  although presented here in a preliminary form  can add to a neces-
sary debate on dairy cooperative reform. The research work was carried out by Dr. 
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was the contracting party with the Research Council.   
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Abstract 
The discussion paper suggests a novel procedure for measuring performance in dairy 
marketing cooperatives. Conventionally, performance in these cooperatives is evaluated 
through a single measure; i.e. the price of raw milk. This single signal measurement 
procedure is reasonable in a situation where the level of capitalization of the cooperative 
is ignorable. But this condition does not hold true in current European dairy markets. 
We suggest an alternative performance measurement procedure, the core idea of which 
is to separate milk content from dairy product value. This enables a distinction between 
monetary returns to milk from monetary returns to invested capital. This dual signal-
approach represents a more transparent picture of dairy cooperative performance, pro-
vides members with purer on-farm (production) and in-cooperative investment incen-
tives and equips them with performance data that enable them to exercise better control 
over their cooperative. 
1 Introduction 
Conventionally, cooperatives are oriented towards paying highest possible prices to the 
members` raw products. This objective is inherently linked to cooperative business, and 
tends to be explicitly stated in by-laws and mission statements. There are at least two 
good reasons for this: (i) First, farmers want to be paid now rather than later for liquid-
ity reasons and because they want to make sure that residual surpluses from the coop-
eratives business flow to them, rather than remain stuck in the organization. (ii) Sec-
ond, the tax system plays a role. While tax systems differ between countries, its gener-
ally true that surpluses distributed to members as integral part of the milk price is tax 
exempt at cooperative level. Milk is simply treated as a cost as seen from the coopera-
tives perspective. In absence of anything like a market price for milk, this practice of-
ten represents a relatively soft tax regime.  
 
It's therefore not surprising that most empirical research on dairy cooperative perform-
ance tends to be based on the assumption that all that matters is the milk price or al-
ternatively that cooperatives are just like any other businesses. The first assumption 
leads to the popular study of milk price tables of various kinds found in farmer maga-
zines and websites (e.g. the European milk price table produced by LTO in the Nether-
lands, the UK milk price watchdog www.milkprices.com, the Irish KMPG Audit of 
milk prices, the German ZMP-Milchpreisvergleich, the Netherlands annual Boerderij 
milk price review etc.). The second assumption is expressed through comparisons of 
profitability ratios between cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs). But the prob-
lem is that both assumptions are inherently deficient. It is true to say that if cooperative 
benefits are expressed in terms of milk prices only, farmers are likely to watch the 
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fluxes of the raw milk prices in order to assess their cooperatives performance. And it 
is also true to claim that cooperatives and IOFs are basically subject to the same set of 
competitive rules, so that it is relevant to compare their performance. But none of these 
two approaches do justice to the complex reality of dairy cooperatives. Alternative ap-
proaches to performance measurement and incentives structures in cooperatives are 
called for. The purpose of this discussion paper is to contribute to this highly necessary 
debate.  
 
More specifically, the first objective is to explore the weaknesses of the two conven-
tional single signal performance measurement models that are commonly found in 
real-life; i.e. the raw milk price and the EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depre-
ciation and amortization);  both as directly reported in the Profit and Loss Accounts of 
the cooperative in question. The second objective of our discussion paper is to propose 
an alternative procedure, more suited for dairy cooperatives that are under increasing 
capitalization. 
 
The discussion paper is structured as follows: In chapter 2, we take a deeper look into 
the shortcomings of the conventional performance measurement procedures that for 
decades have been institutionalized in most cooperatively owned dairy businesses in 
Europe particularly. We make a distinction between two types of performance meas-
urement errors, and three different types of incentive problems. In chapter 3, the under-
lying calculation procedure of the conventional performance measurement model is 
briefly presented, followed by a brief introduction to the alternative we suggest here; 
referred to as the dual-signal performance measurement model. In chapter 4, some 
illustrations of the twin procedures are presented, based on data from nine European 
dairy cooperatives. Conclusions are drawn in chapter 5. 
2 A deeper look into the shortcomings of 
conventional performance measurement  
Nowadays, dairy value creation tends to be less oriented towards raw milk, and more 
oriented towards milk processing. While there is a tendency to start differentiating al-
ternative milk streams, by and large, milk is milk. Milk production requires on-farm 
investments. But research and development, product innovation, branding and the like 
have over decades created a wedge between (i) milk as an industry input and (ii) dairy 
products as an industry output. This wedge tends to be widening over time. Of course, 
dairy production still depends strongly on the milk content, but the contribution of capi-
tal factors becomes increasingly important. This development has not been reflected in 
the performance measurement procedures in most European dairy cooperatives. Milk 
has its value and capital has its value. The dairy cooperative needs both. But the two 
categories of resources are very different, and should be conceptualized and measured 
differently. The unclarities related to performance measurement further lead to blurred 
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incentives for members and other stakeholders. Dairy farmers` investments on their own 
farms are to a large extent based on the raw milk price. In addition, the farmers need 
clear signals as to the monetary value of their cooperative investments. This value cor-
responds to the residual value of dairy production beyond the raw milk content and ad-
ditional company costs. In order to decide between these two alternative investment 
opportunities (on-farm vs. in-cooperative), cooperative members must receive appropri-
ate and reliable price signals. In a situation where capital plays a more dominating role 
in manufacturing of dairy products, assessing the relative performance of dairy coopera-
tives on the basis of milk prices alone is insufficient and fallacious. Still, this is what 
commonly happens in dairy cooperatives throughout Europe. The problem is particu-
larly accentuated in dairy cooperatives that use a pooling approach to their income ac-
counting and distribution. This is a common approach among the leading European 
dairy cooperatives, but to a lesser degree applied in US dairy cooperatives as well.  
 
Clearly, cooperative members are directly influenced by blurred milk price signals. In 
addition, other players may be affected more indirectly. Dairy cooperatives commonly 
act as price leaders in their industry, due to their efforts to pay members highest possi-
ble milk prices. In particular, this holds true in cases where large and strongly perform-
ing cooperatives follow an open membership policy. Subsequently, investor-owned 
firms (IOFs) must source their raw milk at a so high price that it erodes their ability to 
generate profits and dividends at the level their shareholders demand. As a result, the 
IOFs may attract raw milk from other areas, move processing capacity to those regions, 
or divest dairy business altogether. Alternatively, if these IOFs pay lower milk prices to 
their suppliers, they might fail to secure the supply base they need.  
 
The measurement problems that plague cooperatives are not ameliorated by mimicking 
the standard profitability ratios that are typically used for measuring the performance of 
IOFs. The cooperatives` mission is not to accumulate high profits at company level. 
Dairy cooperatives aim at maximizing financial returns to its primary users; i.e. the 
farmer-members who supply milk. This basic fact is well established even in the long-
aged scholarly literature on cooperatives; cf. for instance the classical contribution of 
Robotka (1947). Profitability is a precondition to secure the cooperatives continuity 
and growth, but is balanced with the objective to offer the owners satisfactory raw 
product prices. Straightforward performance comparison of cooperatives and IOFs  
and even between cooperatives themselves insofar as they differ in their capital reten-
tion policy  on the basis of reported profit figures is therefore erroneous and mislead-
ing. Yet this approach appears to be widespread in the scholarly literature (e.g. Parlia-
ment et al. 1989, Lerman and Parliament, 1990 and 1991; Gentzoglanis, 1997; Zwanen-
berg, 1997; Baourakis et al., 2003). As we suggest, even the cooperative research commu-
nity hasnt been of service in providing cooperative leadership and members with reli-
able information and tools to evaluate their cooperative performance.  
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To summarize the discussion, we can distinguish between two types of performance 
measurement errors, and three types of incentive errors that plague conventional per-
formance measurement in cooperatives (cfr. Figure 2.1 below).  
 
Turnover
Cost of sales
(ex milk)
Residual
milk price
So-called
surplus
Board 
determined
reinvestment
Board 
determined
dividend
_
Perf. meas. error #1: 
surplus excluded
Perf. meas. error #2: 
milk price residual
excluded
Incentive error #1: 
oversupply
(>profit dilution)
Incentive error #2: 
underinvestment
(>underperformance)
+
Incentive error #3: 
monitoring problem
(>underperformance
)
 
Figure 2.1 The five interrelated weaknesses of conventional cooperative pricing  
 
 Performance measurement error # 1: Milk league tables fail to include in their analy-
sis any non-price returns to members, as well as of cooperative level retentions. To 
the extent that capital structures and retention policies differ, this leads to incomplete 
findings and hence erroneous messages. For cooperative-IOF performance compari-
sons the mistake is that of excluding profits distributed through the milk price. 
 Performance measurement error # 2: Conventional profitability ratio analysis disre-
gards profits distributed to members through the milk price in the cost of goods 
sold item in the P&L Account. Dividends paid to IOF shareholders, and indeed to 
cooperatives with share-based capital structures as well, are included, in cooperative-
IOF comparisons, making these comparisons erroneous. 
 Incentive error # 1: The cooperative farmer receives a milk price that reflects both 
returns to milk and, increasingly, positive returns from margins on processing and 
marketing activities and profits on non-member, international and non-dairy activi-
ties. As a result he will tend to overinvest at farm-level, leading to oversupply at co-
operative firm level and hence a dilution of cooperative profits in absolute terms (as 
marginal milk is sold in the low end of the market where often margins are negative) 
as well as per kg of milk supplied. 
 Incentive error # 2: Again because of cooperative milk prices reflecting returns on 
(collectively) invested capital, members will tend to underrate the value of their co-
operative investment, potentially threatening the cooperatives capital raising ability 
and hence its strategic investments, ultimately leading to underperformance. 
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 Incentive error # 3: Because of profit distribution through the cooperative milk price, 
the use of profit-based ratio analysis tools becomes quite meaningless, limiting the 
cooperatives leadership ability to properly assess the performance of its manage-
ment at a corporate and divisional level and hence making it difficult to exercise ef-
fective control, again potentially resulting in underperformance. 
 
The fact that these weaknesses of conventional cooperative pricing is intimately related, 
may lead to a vicious dynamics over time. The effect of erroneous incentives in year 1 
can be read off in wrong performance measurement in year 2, and vice versa.  
3 From single-signal to dual-signal 
performance measurement  
We have now briefly presented the major incentive  and performance measurement 
errors that are inherent in the conventional model. The model is commonly referred to 
as cooperative pricing. The alternative title we suggest here is the single-signal-
performance model, since the model attempts to measure all aspects of the cooperative's 
economic reality into one and only signal. As clarified above, the economic reality of 
most cooperatives is nowadays so complex that this single signal is "overloaded". The 
idea that the raw milk price provides all necessary information, is outdated. Here, we 
shall suggest an alternative approach to performance measurement, which stands up to 
the demands for reliable information for highly capitalized cooperatives. In order to do 
so, we shall first sketch the inherent logic of the single-signal model, and apply this a 
frame of reference for the alternative model we advocate here; referred to as the dual-
signal performance measurement model.  
The logic of the single-signal model is presented in Figure 3.1 below. The arrows of the 
figure denote the flow of price signals (i.e. incentives) from the market, via the coopera-
tive to the farmer. The flow of products through the value chain follows the opposite 
direction. Point Ã refers to the costs of raw milk off-farm (i.e. the milk price). Point B 
refers to all other costs incurred by the cooperative (i.e. transportation, processing, 
R&D, marketing, etc.). Point C refers to the cooperatives market returns to dairy prod-
ucts in output markets (i.e. its total turnover). In the conventional single signal per-
formance model of cooperatives, performance (P) is measured as the value of C less 
the value of B. The milk price is a residual price and is commonly taken as a measure 
that reflects the profitability of the cooperative. In other words, members of a dairy co-
operative typically evaluate the performance of their cooperative in terms of the milk 
price they are  
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MarketCooperativeFirm
B
C
Farm
P = Ã = C-B
P
Ã
 
Figure 3.1 The Single signal cooperative performance measurement model: P = 
Ã = (C-B) 
 
offered. In many European dairy cooperatives, capitalization of the cooperative pre-
dominantly takes place through price deductions of members` input (retained earn-
ings), and no other financial instruments are applied. Capital returns are therefore 
channelled from the cooperative to the members through the price of raw milk. In prin-
ciple, therefore, the raw product price should be central in the farmers minds when it 
comes to investment decisions and exercising of control. 
Figure 3.2 below presents the alternative approach we suggest here, referred to as the 
dual signal performance measurement model. In this model, members receive the two 
type of signals they need: (1) a price reflecting the value of milk, and (2) a residual re-
flecting the value of the cooperative capital in a broad sense (i.e. financial capital, hu-
man capital, brand image, infrastructure etc.). The latter signal may also be referred to 
as the cooperative dividend. 
 
MarketCooperativeFirm
B
C
Farm
P = C-(B+ )
Market
P
 
 
Figure 3.2 The dual-signal cooperative performance measurement model: P = C-
(A+B) 
 
Like in Figure 3.1, the arrows denote the flow of incentives through the value chain. 
Point  refers to the costs of raw milk, which are now based on some kind of external 
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measurement and in that respect is fixed and not influenced by internal cooperative 
factors. The reason is that the milk price should reflect the real value of the raw material 
supplied by the members. The crucial difference as compared to the single signal-
model is that the milk price does not serve as a mechanism for paying the members their 
residual claims. Point B refers to all other costs incurred by the cooperative from milk 
collection to the distribution of dairy products. Point C refers to the total turnover of the 
cooperative. This measurement approach should be operationalized in the following 
steps:  
1. Calculate the dairy value normalized at industry level through the returns of a 
fixed basket (index) of dairy commodities based on fixed milk solid (i.e. fat and 
protein) content (measured at point C). Deduce normalized industry costs of 
milk collection, processing and marketing of these dairy commodities. Recalcu-
lated into singly liters is the standardized milk price, which is to be interpreted 
as a proxy for market price.  
2. Arrive at a company-specific milk price by substituting the fixed milk solid con-
tents by the companys actual milk solids content supplied by members on aver-
age (measured at point A)  
3. Recalculate profit (P) of the cooperative firm as the residual of total turnover, 
minus production and other organization costs (B) and member milk purchases 
( ) : i.e. P=C-(B+ ). In other words, adapt the cost of sales component in the 
profit and loss account to reflect the standardized milk price, rather than the av-
erage milk price actually paid out. 
4. Distribute dividends to members on the basis of collective and/or individualized 
member investments per 100 kg. 
 
The dual signal-approach presupposes that the real value of milk can be determined 
through a logical and transparent procedure. Here, we follow the so-called dairy 
value-procedure developed initially by the Dutch Dairy Produce Council and later fol-
lowed up by Campina. 
 
The dairy value calculates the value of a basket of fresh skim milk, cheese, butter, skim 
milk powder, whey powder, and caseinates, using prices of relevant quotations of Euro-
pean commodity markets. It then makes various deductions to account for processing 
and other industry costs based on efficient production assumptions. What remains, is 
the value of milk fat and protein. The dairy value is then published on a per liter vol-
ume and based on standardized milk contents (3.7% fat and 3.4% protein). 
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4 What difference does our measurement 
procedure make? Illustrations from 
leading European dairy cooperatives 
There are three major advantages of the dual signal-approach as compared to the 
single signal-approach: First, it represents a more transparent picture of dairy coop-
erative performance, as well as a more reliable basis for ranking cooperatives according 
to performance. Second, members are equipped with data that can enable them to exer-
cise their control functions more effectively. Third, it informs members better with re-
spect to their investment decisions; i.e. the trade-off between on-farm and in-
cooperative investments. These advantages are particularly important for dairy coopera-
tives that increase their level of capitalization, which is a normal situation for the major-
ity of dairy cooperatives in the current competitive climate.  
 
Whether or not these advantages are evaluated as significant by the beneficiaries, may 
of course vary. But our general hypothesis here is that it makes a difference to measure 
performance in terms of the dual-performance approach as compared to the single-
signal approach. Our recommendation is for cooperatives to develop their performance 
measurement procedures and incentive structure in accordance with the dual perform-
ance measurement approach. For illustrative purposes, we have here compared perform-
ance measurements of eight European dairy cooperatives; i.e. Arla Foods, Friesland 
Foods, Campina, Nordmilch, Glanbia, Valio, First Milk and Milcobel. They are all in-
cluded in the top-20 ranking of European dairy cooperatives; (www.nyenrode.nl/nice). 
The selection of cooperatives was further made on the basis of two criteria: (1) avail-
ability of consolidated annual accounts for the year 2003; and (2) inclusion in the 
monthly milk price tables produced by Netherlands farmers union LTO 
(www.milkprices.nl). The dairy cooperatives in question differ substantially with re-
spect to pricing structure, capital structure and incentive structure; as summarized in 
Table 4.1 below. The pricing structure refers to the procedure by which the level of raw 
milk price is determined. The capital structure refers to the manner by which the coop-
erative finance their activities; including the issue of membership finance. The incentive 
structure is the core question of our discussion; i.e. whether cooperative performance is 
measured by means of a single-signal procedure (raw milk price) or by means of a dual-
signal performance measurement.  
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 Pricing structure for raw 
milk 
Capital structure Incentive structure 
Arla Foods* Cooperative pricing. Financed almost entirely on the 
basis of collective reserves. A 
distributable reserve was intro-
duced in 2004. 
Single signal.  
Friesland 
Foods 
A non-weighted average 
of milk prices paid by five 
other cooperatives in 
neighboring countries, 
historically indexed. 
Collectively held A-shares and 
individually held (certificates of) 
B shares, traded voluntarily at an 
internal bimonthly exchange 
facilitated by an external party. 
Both shares accrue dividends, B 
(cash dividend) at least twice as 
much as A (milk price bonus), 
being maximized at state bonds 
with a premium. 
Dual signal: milk price vs. 
performance related capital 
benefits. 40% of profits are 
distributed to A and B 
shares on a 1:2 ratio. The 
other 60% are added to 
share reserves. In theory, 
the certificate price at the 
bimonthly exchange reflects 
expected future company 
earnings. 
Campina Cooperative pricing; 
Ownership of participation 
units entitles to a fixed 
milk price surplus 
Collective reserves; obligatory 
participation units purchased in 
proportion to current milk deliv-
ery volumes; and an externally 
(informally) tradable bond dis-
tributed to members as part of the 
milk price. 
Single signal. Profits are 
reflected in the milk price. 
Participation units reflect a 
minor portion of the annual 
book value increase of the 
company resulting from 
additions to general re-
serves. Bonds generate a 
dividend which is fixed at 
1% above 45 year state 
bonds and hence their trad-
ing value is independent 
from company value. 
Nordmilch Cooperative pricing. Collective reserves, cooperative 
shares linked to production vol-
ume (one share per 1000 kg) 
deduced from the milk price over 
time, not receiving dividends, and 
redeemed upon exit at nominal 
value. 
Single signal. 
Glanbia Based on other milk prices 
paid in the market and 
taking into account pres-
sure of farmer-
shareholders as well. 
Cooperative shares voluntarily 
tradable twice a year, redeemed at 
nominal value and ~fixed divi-
dend bearing. Redeemable C 
share fund,  0.28c per liter re-
deemed with 50% bonus after five 
years and interest bearing in the 
meantime. 
Dual signal: market based 
milk price vs. performance 
related capital benefits, 
though the latter isnt really 
visibly performance based. 
Valio* Cooperative pricing. Federated cooperative with shares 
held by regional cooperatives, 
being collectively owned by 
members. Also collective reserves 
at central level. 
Single signal. 
First Milk* Cooperative pricing, 
which is basically the 
passing on of the pool 
price as negotiated with 
various parties after de-
duction of costs. 
General reserves and insignificant 
membership based shares. Mem-
bers also pay into a production-
linked, subordinated, non-interest 
bearing Member Investment 
Account. 
Single signal. 
Milcobel* Cooperative pricing. Collective capital and production 
linked cooperative shares, paid up 
digressively during 12 years, with 
a dividend maximized at 6%, and 
redeemed at nominal value. 
Single signal. 
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As shown in Table 4.1 above, two of the cooperatives in our sample Friesland Food 
and Glanbia already practice a kind of dual-signal performance measurement, in the 
form of a cooperative share system that are redeemable and tradable. The other coopera-
tives in our sample employ a single signal incentive structure only.  
 
In Table 4.2 below, the results from our calculations are summarized. For each coopera-
tive, the following variables are listed: (a) Turnover, (b) Their reported milk price (from 
their Profit&Loss-accounts, (c) The milk price standardized on fat and protein content 
(from LTO International Comparison of producers prices for milk), and (d) Their re-
ported EBITDA. Then, the data of column (b) is subject to the Failure 1 mentioned 
above, whereas the data in column (d) is subject to failure 2.  
 
The remaining columns contain data that are calculated according to the dual-signal-
procedure explained earlier. Column (e) presents their re-calculated milk prices, taking 
into account the returns of a fixed basket (index) of dairy commodities based on stan-
dardized milk solid (i.e. fat and protein) content. Column (f) contains the recalculated 
total EBITDA in absolute terms, whereas column (g) shows the final point of our recal-
culation; i.e. EBITDA per 100 kilo milk. 
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   Single signal performance  
measurement 
  Failure 1 Failure 2
Dual signal performance 
measurement 
Coop-
erative * 
(a) 
Turn-
over 
(2003; 
 mio) 
(b) 
Reported milk 
price from 
P&L-
accounts 
(/100kg) 
(c) 
Standardized 
milk price 
(LTO) 
(/100kg)  
(d) 
EBITDA 
(mio) 
(e) 
Adapted 
milk price 
(milk basket 
price) 
(/100 kg) 
(f) 
Adapted 
EBITDA# 
(g) 
Adapted 
EBITDA 
(/100 
kg) 
Arla 
Foods 
(SW) 5,469 
 
 
33.41 
 
 
31.77 
 
 
375.481 
 
 
30.06 584.9 
 
 
9.36 
 
Friesland 
Foods 
(NL) 4,575 
 
 
 
32.00 
 
 
 
30.41 
 
 
 
300.00 
 
 
 
31.30 337.3 
 
 
 
6.37 
 
Campina 
(NL,DE,
BE) 3,655 
 
 
 
32.35 
 
 
 
30.11 
 
 
 
144.700 
 
 
 
30.91 194.4 
 
 
 
5.62 
 
 
Nordmil
ch (DE) 2,140 
 
 
 
26.39 
 
 
 
27.34 
 
 
 
46.097 
 
 
 
28.37 -15.1 
 
 
 
-0.35 
 
Glanbia 
(IR) 2,041 
 
 
26.39 
 
 
28.60 
 
 
131.281 
 
 
27.99 112.9 
 
 
9.86 
 
Tine 
(NO) 1,588 
 
 
42.01 
 
 
- 
 
 
90.606 
 
 
29.72 275.1 
 
 
18.32 
 
Valio 
(FI) 1,566 
 
 
37.80 
 
 
35.69 
 
 
63.100 
 
 
30.08 206.9 
 
 
11.11 
 
First 
Milk 
(UK) 822 
 
 
 
26.62 
 
 
 
24.43 
 
 
 
11.403 
 
 
 
28.88 -44.7 
 
 
 
-2.03 
 
Milcobel 
(BE) 572 
 
 
29.76 
 
 
29.61 
 
 
17.743 
 
 
29.25 21.3 
 
 
3.11 
 
 Milk prices taken from LTO international comparison of producer prices for milk 2003. Prices are based on standardized fat 
and protein contents and identically sized farms and may thus differ from milk prices reported by the respective companies. 
 Source: Calculations based on Annual Reports 
* Company notes:  
 Arla Foods: Milk price in Denmark; EBITDA year ending September 2003; currency conversion at book year ending. 
 Glanbia: carried extraordinary restructuring losses of  90m, i.e. the year 2003 wouldnt seem to be a particularly representa-
tive year; they did pay a dividend of  15m over pre-exceptional profits of  67m, further adding to its loss absorbed. 
 Valio: Milk price based on Kymppi milk price 
 First Milk: Year ending March 2004; currency conversion at book year ending. 
 Milcobel: Milk price of its predecessor Belgomilk 
 
An in-depth interpretation of the results is beyond the scope of this article. However, 
some observations that may be highlighted from this specific sample of eight coopera-
tives are the following:  
 Arla Foods pays out a relatively high milk price (in Denmark and in Sweden, though 
not for about one-third of its milk supplies in the UK). It also performs relatively 
well in terms of profitability. Compared to industry competitor Nestlé with an 
EBITDA to turnover ratio of some 15% its score is still quite modest. However, 
among its cooperative peers it must be concluded that Arla Foods is doing well. 
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 Profitability is also relatively high in the cases of Friesland and Glanbia. This is not 
surprising given the capital ownership structures of both companies. Both companies 
express their performance in paid out dividends. In case of Friesland, shares are held 
by members on a voluntary basis. At Glanbia, shares are traded at the stock ex-
change. Frieslands shareholders also take an interest in the milk price, leading us to 
expect that they would have negotiated a better milk price formula. This explana-
tory variable behind the milk price differentiates between the two cooperatives. 
 Campina and Valio may be argued to be more classical in terms of their ambition to 
pay out high milk prices. Profitability levels are relatively low, while in the case of 
Valio this ratio has been sacrificed in order to pay out a high milk price. 
 Milcobel has a very similar ambition to pay out high milk prices as Campina and 
Valio. And given its relatively high corporate tax rate and considerable freedom to 
pay out milk prices above market price, it makes sense to focus on price rather than 
profitability. As it seems, however, it is simply not performing as well in the market 
place. 
 
The major point we want to make in the discussion paper is that a more reliable plat-
form for signaling and benchmarking is needed, and that the innovative procedure we 
suggest .here do makes a difference. The nature and causes of the differences that are 
revealed in Table 4.2 is a subject for in-depth investigations. The table invites to analy-
sis and reflections associated with the concrete underlying economic realities of each 
and one cooperative. If the cooperative is an over-reporter (adapted EBITDA is sig-
nificantly below the reported EBITDA), the good news for beneficiaries is that the co-
operative is more profitable than normally registered and expected if the cooperative is 
an under-reporter (adapted EBITDA is significantly lower than the reported 
EBITDA), its time to investigate the underlying causes. Which factors are under the 
control of management, and what factors accrue to conditions beyond the control of 
management?  
 
The dual-signal approach is motivated by virtue of its capacity to inform us about the 
true performance of the cooperatives. One aspect of this is whether or not the milk price 
that the cooperatives report (and presumably pay out to their farmers) resembles the 
milk basket price. We argue that the latter more correctly signals the real value of the 
farmers raw milk. Do the cooperatives actually pay out too much or too little as 
compared to this milk basket price? The graph below (Figure 4.1) compares the average 
milk price paid out by nine cooperatives as presented in their annual reports, with the 
milk basket price calculated on the basis of the cooperatives average milk contents 
and standardized valuations of protein and fat. Added on top of the milk basket price is 
a performance indicator that signals the value of invested capital. It has been calculated 
as a percentage of EBITDA per kg of member milk, after correction of the cost of sales 
entry in the cooperatives Profit and Loss account for cooperative pricing. The 50% is 
arbitrary, but is included because EBITDA differs from actual dividend paid. Whether 
or not and how the member actually pockets the capital value signal depends on the 
ownership structure and capital instruments of each specific cooperative. 
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Figure 4.1 Comparing the reported milk price to the milk basket price  
 
Note: Friesland additionally pays a dividend to its supplier members, which has equaled 0.9% of the milk price (ex VAT) during the 
past five years on average. 
 
Based on Figure 4.1, our observations and reflections are as follows:  
1) In the year under review (2003), six cooperatives paid higher milk prices than their 
milk basket price. Tine and Valio stand out as extreme cases, followed to a 
lesser extent by Arla Foods and Campina. We can indicate multiple possible expla-
nations for this variation; among others:  
 Cross-subsidization of the milk price with positive returns on non-dairy activities 
(Glanbia: nutrition and agribusiness; Friesland: beverages);  
 Idem with returns on non-member milk-related transactions (Arla Foods: UK; 
Friesland: Asia and Nigeria; Campina: Russia; Glanbia: USA);  
 Idem with returns from member-milk related value-adding activities (nearly all);  
 Product portfolios differing from the basket used combined with presence in 
markets with a generally high consumer price index (e.g Arla Foods in Denmark 
and Sweden; Tine in Norway; and Valio in Finland) 
 Significant retail market power (e.g. Arla Foods in Denmark; Tine in Norway); 
 Cannibalization of company reserves;  
 Higher efficiency than was assumed in the basket price calculations. 
2) Three cooperatives paid lower milk prices than, based on the milk basket, they 
should have been able to: Nordmilch, Glanbia and First Milk. This might be attrib-
utable to factors such as;  
 Operational inefficiency and/or weak marketing.  
 Investor rather than farmer orientation.  
 Insignificance of market power. 
3) Three cooperatives paid out high prices, whereas in fact they should have paid high 
capital rewards: Tine, Valio and Arla Foods. 
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Such observations of the empirical reality are presented here for illustrative purposes, 
and not explored in-depth. Our indicative explanations might be contested by the coop-
eratives in question. Our main purpose is to illustrate how the use of a non-conventional 
performance measurement approach can support cooperatives and their members to 
address fundamental questions and suggest innovative answers as to the actual perform-
ance of dairy cooperatives. 
5 Summary and conclusion 
The first objective of our discussion has been to address the weaknesses of the two con-
ventional single signal performance measurement procedures; i.e. the raw milk price 
and the EBITDA. The weaknesses have been summarized in form of two performance 
measurement problems and three incentive problems. These five problems are held to 
be intimately related, and may generate a problematic development over time for the 
cooperative and their members.  
 
To ameliorate such weaknesses, we have advocated an alternative approach to perform-
ance measurement; referred to as the dual signal performance measurement. This en-
ables a distinction between monetary returns to milk (i.e. referring to the members on-
farm investments) from monetary returns to capital (i.e. referring to the members` in-
cooperative investments). We claim that this dual signal-approach to a larger degree 
than the conventional single signal-approach reflects the underlying economic reali-
ties of dairy cooperatives. Members are better informed with respect to their optimal 
investment decisions; i.e. the trade-off between investing on their farm or in their coop-
erative. Members are also equipped with data that enables them to exercise their resid-
ual ownership control of the cooperative more effectively. A further advantage is that 
the dual-signal performance measurement procedure lays a reliable basis for any type of 
cooperative benchmarking that involves raw milk price and/or profitability. The true 
gap between the performance of diverse cooperatives  is revealed.  
 
Our empirical illustrations based on a sample of eight European dairy cooperatives con-
firm that the alternative performance measurement approach makes a difference. Ac-
cording to this example, some of the cooperatives in question actually paid a milk price 
that was too high as compared to the calculated dairy value. Other cooperatives seem 
to pay a milk price that was too low, as compared to the calculated dairy value. It 
should be kept in mind, however, that our purpose here has not first and foremost been 
to interpret these substantial results in any depth. Other samples of cooperatives would 
have given other substantial results and stimulated other specific questions with respect 
to the underlying causes and dynamics. Our objective is to motivate that the dual-signal 
approach to performance measurement is a useful innovation for dairy and similar co-
 18 
operatives that offer a more reliable measurement of the value of their raw milk and 
capital. 
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